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Abstract:  Inspired by calls to ‘decolonise’ South African law and legal education, this paper will posit 
some hypotheses as to the nature of a living customary law of commercial contracting from the 
perspectives of two South African contract law teachers.  An account of the commercial format of 
customary contracting is largely absent from the law reports and leading legal textbooks in this country.  
The dominant narrative in existing legal sources, however, (which may be stereotyped), is of African 
communalism prevailing in customary contract practice.  This is reflected (for example) in the discourse 
on ‘ubuntu’, which is being used at present as a vehicle for the constitutional transformation of the 
South African common law of contract.  Other existing empirical accounts from discourses such as 
economics and anthropology also suggest, however, that contracting in indigenous African 
communities rests on notions of trust and community.  This is reinforced by the existence of informal 
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township dispute resolution structures.  We will thus posit a central hypothesis that customary 
commercial contracting is relational in nature, using an inter-disciplinary literature review and drawing 
on the lived experiences of the authors.  Other related hypotheses will also be developed.  Ultimate truth 
here is a matter for future empirical study.   
I INTRODUCTION 
Calls for ‘decolonisation’ of (contract) law and (contract) legal education in South African 
universities present a bit of a conundrum to us as local contract teachers.1  In this country, 
decolonisation, in the technical sense of throwing off the yoke of a foreign colonial power, 
happened decades ago.2  Of course, white minority rule only ended long after that, however, 
and racialized economic inequality remains a feature of the South African landscape despite 
the emergence of a black middle class.3  Hence, ‘decolonisation of law and the legal 
curriculum’ as concepts used by our students must be taken to have a more figurative and 
symbolic meaning.  Our intention here is not engage the literature on decolonial theory, or to 
attempt a definition of ‘decolonisation’ as a concept to be applied in contemporary South 
Africa.  Rather, our aim is to address a perceived epistemological gap in the African customary 
law discourse, namely the absence of an account of contemporary commercial practices by 
indigenous black South Africans.  In our view and as we shall explain below, this gap arises 
 
1 This call has been firmly placed on the national higher education agenda by student protests occurring 
intermittently on most university campuses in South Africa since 2015.  For an account of what the student protests 
were/are about, as well as the broader social and political context, the reader is referred to Susan Booysen (ed) 
Fees Must Fall: Student Revolt, Decolonisation and Governance in South Africa (2016).   
2 South Africa experienced Dutch colonialism from 1652 until 1795, whereafter it fell under English colonial 
power (except for a brief period between 1803 and 1806).  Substantial independence was achieved by the ruling 
white authorities following the promulgation of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, however.  In 1948, the newly 
elected nationalist government introduced a policy known as ‘Apartheid’.  This Apartheid government declared 
South Africa to be a fully independent republic in 1961 and left the British Commonwealth the same year under 
pressure from Britain.  For accounts of South African legal history, see in particular Reinhard Zimmermann & 
Daniel Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996); HR Hahlo & Ellison 
Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1968) chapter 17; DH Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg (1983) 476-503.  
3 The transition to fully democratic government under the African National Congress commenced formally on 27 
April 1994.  For an economic history of Apartheid South Africa, followed by an analysis of inequality in 
contemporary post-Apartheid South African society, see J Seekings & N Nattrass Class, Race and Inequality in 
South Africa (2005).  For a discussion of the relationship between law and poverty, see J Modiri ‘Law’s Poverty’ 
2015 (18) PELJ 224. 
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from colonial policies, particularly surrounding issues of choice of law and African legal 
capacity.  Our inquiry, based on an inter-disciplinary literature review, will rather propose a 
theoretical basis for a new line of African customary law inquiry.   
As scholars in a discourse which is framed largely by historical and comparative 
scholarship on contracting, often grounded in European ‘parent’ legal systems, one could 
perhaps be forgiven for not having before pondered the issue of what is ‘African’ about 
contracting in South Africa, since this is not a topic traditionally covered in university legal 
education, or indeed in the academic discourse on contracts.  Indeed, when one finally wakes 
up and demands an answer to this question, it is remarkably difficult to dig up appropriate study 
materials.  Progressive private law is largely concerned at present with how to 
‘constitutionalise’ the common law; while African customary law remains for the most part 
confined to the traditional ‘ghettos’ of family law, the law of succession, traditional leadership, 
and land rights.4  What about commercial transactions?  What is the governing legal regime 
for stokvels, burial societies, loan sharks (mashonisa), reciprocal loans between friends and 
family, or sales of immovable property in our informal settlements?  Most would probably 
immediately refer to the ‘law on the books’, including specific pieces of legislation and indeed 
the residual common law of contract.  Such a response would no doubt add that there is in fact 
only one system of South African law and that is law under the Constitution.5  While this is 
possibly true, at least in a formal, positivist sense, what about in the de facto sense (‘law in 
action’)?  And where does that leave the theory of law known as legal pluralism, which has 
adherents all around the world, including most customary lawyers in South Africa, who have 
probably been thinking all along: what is the living African customary law of commercial 
contracting in South Africa?6  In this country, our Constitution holds that we are a legally plural 
 
4 Compare on African customary law, the leading texts of C Himonga & T Nhlapo (eds) African Customary Law 
in South Africa: Post-Apartheid and Living Law Perspectives (2014); and TW Bennett Customary Law in South 
Africa (2004). 
5 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re ex parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC), para 44; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC), para 22.   
6 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) define ‘legal pluralism’ at 45.  See further: TW Bennett, ‘African Customary 
Law’ in M Reimann & R Zimmermann (eds) Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 641, 666-671.  For 
discussion of the concept of ‘living customary law’ in particular, see: TW Bennett ‘“Official” v “Living” 
Customary Law: Dilemmas of Description and Recognition’ in A Claassens & B Cousins (eds) Land, Power, 
Custom (2008) 138. 
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system.7  This form of State-law pluralism, with an officially recognised African customary 
law which applies ‘when applicable’,8 should be distinguished from ‘deep’ legal pluralism 
which describes the pluralism phenomenon in a broader sense, namely the fact that de facto 
‘semi-autonomous social fields’9 exist, which create binding normative systems for their 
relevant communities.10  This type of normative system, growing from the people upwards, 
rather than from the state downwards, is largely what will be described when we introduce our 
target context of the ‘popular’ economy.  This allows us to look beyond the existing African 
customary law discourse to new social science sources for inspiration. 
 In this article, we the present authors, two South African-educated contract lawyers 
with an interest in (inter alia) legal theory, legal history, legal and economic anthropology, the 
constitutionalisation of contract law, and the future of African customary law, would like to 
posit some hypotheses about what a living customary law of commercial contracting in South 
Africa might look like.  Of course, a reader may protest that a concept of a living customary 
law of any kind should only be put forward after extensive empirical research.  This, we 
acknowledge is true.  For now, our method will be to draw on the work of others in establishing 
a context in which African customary commercial contracting could operate.  Nkanyiso 
Sibanda, one half of the present authorship, has first-hand experience of his own ethnic strain 
of African customary law.  In places we will use his lived experience to supplement our written 
sources as a form of anecdotal evidence arising from his participation in the Cape Town popular 
economy.  Most of the details related using this method are fairly trite and are common 
knowledge in South African indigenous circles: we hope that the reader will excuse the 
resultant absence of referencing where this occurs.  Where possible, we rely on published 
accounts.   
This paper will proceed as follows: in part II, we will briefly situate our study using 
prevailing contract and legal theories.  In part III we will set out some of the relevant aspects 
of the established legal discourse on African customary law.  First hereunder, we will address 
 
7 See section 211(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Sally Falk Moore ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Field of 
Study’ (1972-1973) 7 Law & Society Review 719. 
10 On the difference between state-law or weak legal pluralism and deep or unofficial legal pluralism, see C 
Rautenbach & JC Bekker Introduction to Legal Pluralism 4ed (2014) chapter 1. 
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conceptual issues as to the nature of ‘African’ customary law.  We will then move to the 
accounts of customary contracting by other writers on African customary law – our version 
will remain general, here, however, without describing specific transactions.11  We introduce 
the published material subject to the same proviso above that the African customary law scholar 
should be careful not to get trapped in the epistemological snare of relying on written accounts 
of African customary law as being sacrosanct.  We use these materials merely as a textbook 
style illustration of some of the literature available and subject to the caution that what we may 
be representing is ‘official’ customary law.  Using the same methodology, we will also discuss 
African customary law dispute resolution in a more traditional setting, since we feel that this 
is relevant to our theoretical claims which we will develop in what follows.  In part IV, we will 
move our concept of African customary contracting out of the traditional narrative’s milieu, 
into the so-called ‘popular economy’, an economic context described by South African social 
scientists and by which we intend to refer in this study to South Africa’s urban townships.  This 
popular economy will serve as a new narrative site for discussion of ‘customary commercial 
contracting’, for which we will rely on the previously published empirical studies of others.  
We will draw on such sources to posit some hypotheses about the nature of a (modern, 
urbanised) living customary law of commercial contracting.  Part V will summarise our central 
hypotheses as introduced in the preceding parts.  Part VI will conclude. 
 A final caveat before we continue: the term ‘African’ is employed in this article subject 
to notional ‘scare’ quotation marks.  We don’t intend to generalise or to stereotype here.  We 
are responding to calls for contract law and contract legal education to better speak to the 
‘African’ context, as well as Constitutional Court dicta to this effect.12  We hope that we do 
not fall into the trap of setting up an African exceptionalism: rather we explicitly work from 
certain universal assumptions, particularly the economic laws of the market place and the 
commonality of personal and business needs in a commercial context.  Indeed, it is in this 
regard that we acknowledge that the previously stated business reasons may underlie much of 
 
11 For specific types of traditional African customary law contracts, see: Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 188-
195.  
12 The clearest dictum to this effect is to be found in the minority judgment of Yacoob J in Everfresh Market 
Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256 (CC), para 23.  See also: the majority judgment 
of Ncgobo J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), para 51; the majority judgment of Moseneke J in 
Everfresh, para 72.  Compare the sentiment expressed by Madlanga J in Paulsen and Another v Slip Knot 
Investments 777 2015 (3) SA 479 (CC), para 66. 
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the universality of contract laws around the world, which requires a normative response from 
us as to what the potential role of incorporation of a parallel system of African customary 
commercial contract law might be. 
II A THEORY OF CONTRACTING 
(a) Contract, status and legal theory 
In an influential nineteenth century work, Maine posited that: ‘the movement of the progressive 
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.’13  What Maine argued was 
that in early societies, one’s role and influence was largely shaped by one’s membership of a 
traditional social grouping, particularly one’s family.14  Maine’s thesis was that as society 
progressed, parties achieved a greater measure of personal autonomy and were able to associate 
with one another and allocate resources by agreement, so that one might bargain for a better 
deal and improve one’s status in society through contracting.15  This theory fits in nicely with 
ideas like freedom of contract, laissez-faire economics, and (political) social contractarianism, 
which would have characterised the British social context in which Maine wrote.16  Indeed, 
ideas such as the ‘civilising mission of contract’, much reviled in certain modern circles, could 
be thrown in here.17  A movement towards a monetised economy and wage labour, and away 
from hereditary social hierarchies underpin this type of philosophy.  It also works well in 
 
13 HS Maine Ancient Law cheap ed (1905 [1861]) 151. 
14 Ibid, see in particular chapter 5. 
15 Ibid 149-151.  See also chapter 9. 
16 PS Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) part II describes the period of British history 
between 1770 and 1870 as ‘the age of freedom of contract’.  Atiyah’s history of the concept of freedom of contract 
(and related philosophical and economic trends) ends at the time of writing (the late 1970s), where he reflects that 
the ‘wheel had come full circle’ and that freedom of contract as a concept had ‘fallen’ in his contemporary British 
epoch.  In this conclusive chapter 22 (at 716) he makes the observation that in his contemporary Britain, there had 
been a ‘reversion from “contract” to “status”’, citing Maine.  While the British political economy was to take a 
turn to the right shortly thereafter, this observation by Atiyah is an interesting one.  Indeed it is useful exercise to 
similarly reflect on the contract/status theme in our own contemporary South Africa: the conclusion in part VI 
below will return to this theme. 
17 For critical discussion with reference to the literature, see: A Supiot Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological 
Function of the Law (2007) 79-86; L Siliquini-Cinelli ‘Reflections on the Pactum in the Public and Private 
Spheres’ in L Siliquini-Cinelli & A Hutchison (eds) The Constitutional Dimension of Contract Law: A 
Comparative Perspective (2017) 289.  In South Africa, this terminology is linked with colonialism, rather than 
liberalism per se, see for example: Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 6. 
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conjunction with a liberal free-market economy and prevailing (contemporary British) notions 
of capitalism. 
 What the ‘status to contract’ progression does not account for, however, is the social 
nature of humans, particularly with regard to contracting.  Although first discussed as a theory 
of contracting over a century after Maine wrote, relational contract theory has demonstrated 
the ever-present significance of human relations and networks in contracting, particularly in 
repeated or ongoing transactions.18  There is a strong inter-personal element to business, which 
can manifest as co-operation as well as competition.  Indeed, norms such as trust and 
reciprocity are as much a part of business as adversarialism and opportunism.  Inter-personal 
relations are also among the reasons why negotiation remains the most prevalent form of 
dispute resolution in business, regardless of what the law of contract in a given location might 
be.19  To the extent that a given site for contracting is in a community (read: localised market) 
where the role players are known to each other, it is likely that contracting will adhere to the 
tenets of relational contract theory.   
 This is not to say, of course, that there is no element of individualism to contract 
practice.  Writing from a United States point of view, Fried’s argument that contracting is based 
on individual determinism and that issues of distributive justice are best left to the public law 
realms of taxation and welfare, hold water, at least in the setting of formal, liberal, Westernised 
contract law.20  What this theory rests on of course, are the dual notions of personal autonomy 
and private property.21  Much of the conventional narrative on ‘African’ social norms holds 
that ‘African’ society is more communal in nature than ‘Western’ society, and that the interests 
 
18 For the seminal texts, see (for example): IR Macneil ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’ (1974) 47 Southern 
California LR 691; IR Macneil The New Social Contract: an Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (1980); 
S Macaulay ‘Non-contractual Relations in Business – A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 American Sociological Rev 
55.  For secondary discussion of relational contract theory, see for example: D Campbell (ed) The Relational 
Theory of Contract: Selected Works of Ian Macneil (2001); J Braucher, J Kidwell & WC Whitford (eds) Revisiting 
the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay (2013); D Campbell, L Mulcahy & S Wheeler (eds) Changing 
Concepts of Contract: Essays in Honour of Ian Macneil (2016).  For a different take on relational contract theory 
see: H Collins Regulating Contracts (1999). 
19 For contract sources, the seminal text is: Macaulay (note 18 above). From an alternative dispute resolution point 
of view, see: R Fisher, W Ury & B Patton Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In 3 ed 
(2012); J Brand, F Steadman & C Todd Commercial Mediation: A User’s Guide (2012) chapter 2. 
20 C Fried Contract as Promise (1981). 
21 Ibid, see in particular the foundational chapter 2. 
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of the individual are often sub-ordinated to that of the group.22  Gyekye, a Ghanaian, describes 
how this type of argument was employed by post-colonial leaders in several African countries 
in order to found a system of government based on ‘African socialism’.23  Gyekye and other 
African philosophers argue against this type of narrative: in their view, there is no opposition 
to individualism, or individual interests in most African cultures.24  One need not be entirely 
altruistic or selfless in one’s behaviour.  Rather, Gyekye convincingly puts forward a notion of 
‘moderate communitarianism’, in which there is space for individual interests, provided these 
are tempered with social responsibility.25  This is a fascinating conception of the political 
economy, which resonates with (for example) the special protection given to socio-economic 
rights under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the Constitution’).26  
Gyekye’s account leaves room for basic principles of autonomy and private property, which 
underlie liberal theories of contracting, such as Fried’s.  We submit, however, that Gyekye’s 
moderate communitarianism is possibly closer to the South African model of a constitutionally 
circumscribed model of contracting, than to other systems (such as Fried’s model) which 
recognise a greater role for freedom of contract.   
For our account below, we do not wish to take issue with either contractual autonomy 
or private property, both of which are at the heart of most market-based systems of contract 
law, which would include South Africa.  Our approach to contract theory will be from a 
different angle, focussing on the socially embedded nature of contractual relations and legal 
pluralism.  We hope to provide a new South African angle on the status to contract claim: our 
view is that there is a strong relational element to all contracts, including customary ones (that 
is, a ‘status’); and that if one accepts legal pluralism theory, this status element is very much a 
part of contract law, especially in the modern South African customary context.  Hence status 
 
22 In South Africa, the literature on ubuntu refers: Mokgoro, ‘Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa’ (1998) 4 
Buffalo Human Rights LR 15; D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds), Ubuntu and the Law (2012); F Diedrich (ed) 
Ubuntu, Good Faith & Equity: Flexible Legal Principles in Developing a Contemporary Jurisprudence (2011); 
H Keep & R Midgley ‘The Emerging Role of ‘Ubuntu-Botho in Developing a Consensual South African Legal 
Culture’ in F Bruisma & D Nelken (eds), Explorations of Legal Cultures (Elsevier 2007) 29; C Himonga ‘The 
Right to Health in an African Cultural Context: The Role of Ubuntu in the Realization of the Right to Health with 
Special Reference to South Africa’ (2013) 57 J of African Law 165; L Praeg A Report on Ubuntu (2014). 
23 K Gyekye Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the Africa Experience (1997) chapter 5. 
24 Ibid, chapter 2.  See further: DA Masolo Self and Community in a Changing World (2010) 245-250. 
25 Gyekye (note 23 above) chapter 2. 
26 For an Afrocentric defence of socio-economic rights in South Africa, see: Himonga (note 22 above). 
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and contract exist contemporaneously and are both vital parts of modern customary commercial 
contracts.  
(b) Legal pluralism and contracting in South Africa: existing texts 
Where then does one begin with a literature review to investigate the living African customary 
law of commercial contracting in South Africa?  Existing signposts in written sources include 
the following: 
i. Textbook accounts of African customary law in South Africa;27 
ii. Judgments of South African courts, particularly the apex Constitutional Court, on 
contracting;28 and 
iii. Published empirical studies of the popular economy.29 
Of these three possible avenues of inquiry, textbook accounts (category (i)) represent 
(in our view) a largely pre-commercial vision of society, which Himonga and Nhlapo warn 
may be a distorted and outdated picture.30  Indeed, we have our doubts about the methodology 
of presentation of certain accounts of African customary law, particularly those on contracting, 
since the terminology and categorical excursus is sometimes closely based on Roman law.  We 
feel that this is a key epistemological error in African customary law analysis as it assimilates 
such customary law to the European discourse.  Our view in this paper is that contracting, as a 
process, is indeed a universal cultural phenomenon based on consensual exchange, but that 
alien terminology should not be imposed on it.31  In our view, some accounts thus represent 
 
27 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above); TW Bennett (note 4 above); Rautenbach & Bekker (note 10 above); JC 
Bekker ‘Law of Contract’ in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa Vol 32 ‘Indigenous Law’ 2 ed (2009) 
paras 230-243. 
28 There is a growing list of these cases.  In addition to the Barkhuizen, Everfresh and Paulsen cases cited in note 
12 above, see in particular: Botha v Rich NO 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC); Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 (4) 121 (CC).  
Omitted here are several cases on specific consumer law regimes, such as residential leases and consumer credit. 
29 These sources will be discussed in part IV below. 
30 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 195, citing RB Mqeke Customary Law and the New Millenium (2003) 118. 
31 Our view is of course an opinion, rather than an empirically proven fact.  We simply intend to draw attention 
to the idea that contracts, in the sense of obligations created by agreement, are likely to be found in any grouping 
of people who are not individually self-sufficient.  We argue further that contracting is the basis of any sort of 
business, and that a concept of agreements which are viewed as being normatively binding is fundamental to such 
business and is hence universal in that sense. 
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the material better than others.  These traditional sources will nevertheless be discussed in the 
following part III.   
Then, the dicta from the Constitutional Court (category (ii)) present a potentially 
idealised vision of society, which, at least in the cases dealing with contracts, is seldom backed 
up by empirical evidence, relying rather on a judge’s own personal world view, or a nominally 
‘African’ world-view.32  While the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on contracting has 
demonstrated a desire to introduce greater fairness, and particularly distributive (‘social’) 
justice through transforming the common law, there has been very little attempt to develop a 
living customary law of contracting.  (This is probably best explained, in a precedent based 
system, by a lack of appropriate cases.)  A database search of South African case precedents 
from all levels of the judiciary and going back several decades also reveals little of use here.33  
We will not dwell too long on an analysis of the constitutional dimension of contract law in 
South Africa, or the concomitant notion of ‘ubuntu’.  This has been done elsewhere by 
ourselves and others.34  
Avenue (iii) presents potentially the most productive avenue of inquiry, although the 
material here is largely not the work of lawyers, but rather economic anthropologists and 
economic sociologists.  It is from category (iii) empirical studies that the most can be learned 
(in our view) about how indigenous African people who may today reside in urban settings, 
but who still choose to observe certain African customary law practices,   go about the business 
 
32 Compare the passages cited in note 12 above.   
33 There are exceptions, see for example: Mndi v Malgas 2006 (2) SA 182 (EPD), a case concerning a stokvel. 
34 For leading views of South African scholars on the constitutionalisation of contract law, see (ex pluribus): 
Deeksha Bhana ‘The Role of Judicial Method in Contract Revisited (2015) 132 SALJ 122; Malcolm Wallis 
‘Commercial Certainty and Constitutionalism: Are They Compatible’ (2016) 133 SALJ 545; Dennis M Davis & 
Karl Klare ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law’ (2010) 26 SAJHR 403; Jaco 
Barnard-Naudé ‘Of Dorothy’s Dog, ‘Poststructural’ Fairy Tales … and the Real: Power, Poverty and the General 
Principles of the South African Law of Contract’ (2013) 29 SAJHR 469; FDJ Brand, ‘The role of good faith, 
equity and fairness in the South African law of contract: A Further Instalment’ (2016) 27 Stell LR 238; Carole 
Lewis, ‘The uneven journey to uncertainty in contract’ 2013 (76) THRHR 80.  
For Andrew Hutchison’s views on constitutional/contract law, see (for example): Alistair Price & 
Andrew Hutchison ‘Judicial review of exercises of contractual power: South Africa’s divergence from the 
common law tradition’ (2015) 79 Rabels Z 822; Andrew Hutchison ‘Decolonisation of South African contract 
law: an argument for synthesis’ in Luca Siliquini-Cinelli & Andrew Hutchison (eds) The Constitutional 
Dimension of Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis (Springer, 2017) 151. 
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of commercial contracting.35 This context will be set out part IV.  The result will be a set of 
hypotheses about the living customary law of commercial contracting in South Africa from 
which to work in possible future empirical studies.  
Of course, we also require a reason for this perceived gap in the representation of 
African customary law.  We believe that there are historical reasons for this, particularly in the 
South African context of a prior system of white minority rule and black sub-ordination and 
disenfranchisement.  A useful source for this type of argument would be Chanock’s alternative 
history of the formative early twentieth century period of South African law and society.36  
Chanock argues that South African law was systematically segregated during this period into 
one branch (‘common law A’), which served the needs of the white population (here, of course, 
we mean the Roman Dutch/English law mixture); and another branch (‘common law B’) which 
served the African population (African customary law, but as applied and distorted by white 
government officials).37  Supervening on these two systems of law were choice of law rules 
which favoured ‘common law A’ in most commercial types of contract, particularly where one 
of the parties was white, or a white-owned juristic person.38  This led to the side-lining of the 
development of a ‘common law B’ of commercial contracting – leaving this branch of the law 
to operate largely in a familial setting.39  Central to Chanock’s argument is that this process 
was not about (contract) law at all, but rather about race and specifically African capacity to 
partake in the South African economy.40  
We will argue in what follows that this does not mean that there is no such thing as an 
African customary commercial contract law; Chanock’s history does, however, suggest why 
there is no ‘official’ version of this branch of the law.  Whether the future of contract law in 
South Africa should hold a reconciliation of ‘common law A’ and ‘common law B’, including 
in the law of contract, is a question to which we will return in our concluding part VI.  De facto, 
two parallel systems of law continue to operate – this is unlikely to change with regard to a 
 
35 Indigenous African people who reside in South African urban areas have a unique mode of social ordering, 
which has resulted in them observing African customary law in a manner which takes into cognisance the needs 
of urban life.  See part VI(b) below for further details. 
36 M Chanock The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice (2001). 
37 Ibid, this is the central narrative throughout the book. 
38 Ibid, again this is central.  See in particular part IV, especially chapters 13 and 14. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid, see in particular the discussion of the ownership of land in South Africa in chapter 15. 
12 
 
‘living’ ‘common law B’ (particularly from the point of view of deep legal pluralism) – but 
some form of future synthesis may be an option for ‘common law A’, with implications for the 
law of commercial contracting in South Africa generally.41 
III THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW OF CONTRACTING 
In what follows we will set out a largely textbook account of African customary law, African 
customary contracting, and African customary dispute resolution, as captured in the South 
African legal discourse.  This material may be familiar to those with an interest in African 
customary law, and some of it would be covered in standard LLB courses on this subject in 
South African universities.  We will give a summary of these topics nevertheless, in the 
interests of presenting a balanced literature review of the available material and in order to 
contextualise the reader who has a low level of familiarity with textbook accounts of African 
customary law.  We also set up this representation, which we will call the ‘traditional’ account, 
in order to juxtapose it with an edgier social science account of commercial contracting in the 
‘popular economy’ of South Africa’s urban townships in the following part IV.   
(a) A working definition of African customary law 
Many writers have already dealt with the challenges related to having one universally 
acceptable definition of African customary law so we will not repeat this material.42  For our 
purposes, it will, however, be helpful to propose a working definition of African customary 
law against which our hypotheses may be tested.  
Initial definitions of ‘African customary law’ explained this concept as those norms and 
practices which only applied to members of a particular cultural group to the exclusion of 
others.  Hamnett, for example, viewed African customary law as ‘a set of norms which the 
 
41 For argument to this effect, see Hutchison (note 34 above – 2017).  
42 See for example: ZN Jobodwana ‘Customary Courts and Human Rights; Comparative African Perspectives’ 
(2000) 15 SA Public Law 26, 30-33; Bennett (note 4 above) chapter 1; TW Bennett A Sourcebook of African 
Customary Law for Southern Africa (1991) chapter 1; C Himonga & C Bosch ‘The application of African 
Customary Law under the Constitution of South Africa: Problems solved or just beginning?’ (2000) 117 SALJ 
306; I Hamnett Chieftainship and Legitimacy: An anthropological study of executive law in Lesotho (1975) 
chapter 1; TW Bennett ‘Re-introducing African customary law to the South African legal system’ (2009) 57 
American J of Comparative Law 1; V Bronstein ‘Reconceptualising the customary law debate in South Africa’ 
(1998) 14 SAJHR 388.  
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actors in a social situation abstract from practice and which they invest with binding 
authority’.43  Jobodwana, by contrast, stressed the importance of ‘customs and traditions’ 
which work to regulate the way community members live.44  In an analogous context, Bennett 
described African customary law as deriving ‘from social practices that the community 
concerned accepts as obligatory.’45  
Various pieces of legislation offer additional definitions of African customary law: for 
example, the Law of Evidence Amendment Act46 (‘LEAA’) gave the first statutory definition 
of African customary law in South Africa. At section 1(4), the LEAA defined African 
customary law as ‘the law or custom as applied by the Black tribes in the Republic’.  In 1998, 
a new definition of African customary law was introduced by the South African Law Reform 
Commission,47 which was also later incorporated into the Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act,48 as well as the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related 
Matters Act.49 This definition refers to African customary law as ‘the customs and usages 
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form 
part of the culture of those peoples.’50  
While various definitions of African customary law have thus been suggested, these all 
share common definitional attributes, which feature assists in bringing some consensus to what 
the concept of African customary law in South Africa entails.  A working definition therefore 
would thus rest on two notions: first, that such law consists of customs and usages that are 
traditionally observed by a community of indigenous African people of South Africa; and 
secondly, there must be a claim that these practices form part of the culture of those people and 
hence have normative force.  It is important that these customs should be widely accepted and 
acknowledged by a traditional indigenous group.51  According to Bennett, rules that are not 
 
43 Hamnett (note 42 above) 14. 
44 Jobodwana (note 42 above) 30. 
45 Bennett (note 4 above) 1; see also Bennett (note 6 above) 138. 
46 Act 45 of 1988. 
47 See: South African Law Commission Project 90: Report on customary marriages (1998) 43. 
48 Act 120 of 1998. 
49 Act 11 of 2009. 
50 See the definition of ‘customary law’ provided in section 1 of both Acts. 
51 In Van Breda v Jacobs 1921 AD 330, the court held that for a custom to be acknowledged in law, it must meet 
four requirements, namely: it must be long established; reasonable, uniformly observed; and certain. Himonga & 
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acknowledged by people or that are dictated by outsiders as African customary law are 
invalid.52 To this effect, Jobodwana reiterates that it is important for a traditional community’s 
members to actually accept the body of rules as binding on themselves.53 
There are two forms of African customary law that co-exist and are acknowledged in 
South Africa: ‘living’ customary law and ‘official’ customary law:54 
Living customary law consists of the actual rules and practices which govern the 
indigenous people whose law is being considered.55  It comprises unwritten practices that 
regulate the day-to-day lives of a traditional community or a person who belongs to such a 
community.  These social practices, however, are continually changing in accordance with the 
evolving practices of the community.56  Bekker and Rautenbach echo this sentiment, arguing 
that an important attribute of living customary law is its perpetual adaptation to the evolution 
of a community: it is not static.57  Commenting on the changing nature of living customary 
law, Bennett wrote:  
‘Systems of custom therefore have the remarkable ability to allow forgotten rules to sink into 
oblivion, while simultaneously accepting new rules to take their place, always on the 
understanding that the new is old.’58  
 
Nhlapo (note 4 above) 30-31 distinguish, however, the nature of living customary law from the Roman Dutch 
concept of custom.  Nevertheless, in Shilubana v Nwamitwa, 2007 (2) SA 432 (SCA), the court reiterated the fact 
that for a practice to be regarded as a custom, it should have been observed immemorially. 
52 Bennett (note 6 above) 138. 
53 Jobodwana (note 42 above) 30. 
54 The co-existence of these two types of customary laws has been acknowledged by the courts. See for example 
Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 (2) SA 1074 (T); Ramuhovhi and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others 2016 (6) SA 210 (LT); Shilubana (note 51 above); Makholiso and Others v Makholiso and Others 
1997 (4) SA 509 (TkS).    
55 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 26.   
56 See also Ramuhovhi (note 54 above) para 51 where the court held that the very nature of African customary law 
is that it is ‘a dynamic, evolving system of values, inherently flexible, and which is practised in a specific 
community’.  In the context of African customary contracting, see: S Mancuso ‘Trends on the Harmonization of 
Contract Law in Africa’ (2007) 13 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 157, 175.  
57 JC Bekker & C Rautenbach ‘Nature and Sphere of African Customary Law’ in Rautenbach & Bekker (note 10 
above) 29. 
58 Bennett (note 4 above) 2. 
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This dynamic characteristic of living customary law has also been acknowledged by the 
courts: for example, the majority judgment in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha referred to living 
customary law as a ‘dynamic system of law which is continually evolving to meet the changing 
circumstances of the community in which it operates’.59  In Alexkor, the Constitutional Court 
explained that living customary law refers to a set of traditional rules which have been in 
existence since time immemorial which have always changed and developed to address the 
needs of the relevant population.60  The Constitutional Court held further that this system of 
law would ‘continue to evolve within the context of its values and norms consistently with the 
Constitution’.61 In similar fashion, the same court in Shilubana held that the very nature of 
living customary law is that it is not static but adaptative.62  
Living customary law is thus not stagnant; rather, it always recognises and 
acknowledges on-going changes amongst people who are bound by it and who adapt to such 
changes for the convenience of the community.  This means that out-dated African customary 
law rules which are no longer being observed by the community are replaced by new ones, 
without the need for a formal process of amending the rules.  A classic example of such a 
change is found in Shilubana.  In this case, the Valoyi Royal Council changed the patriarchal 
principle of male primogeniture,63 which allowed only males to succeed as King, and instead 
allowed a female to succeed to the throne in line with the equality provision in section 9 of the 
 
59 Bhe and Others v Magistrate , Khayelitsha , and Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae); 
Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), para 153. 
60 Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC), para 153. 
61 Ibid, para 153. 
62 Shilubana v Nwamitwa, (note 51 above), para 54; SALC Project 90 (note 47 above), para 2.3.2; TR Nhlapo 
‘The African Family and Women's Rights: Friends or Foes’ (1991) Acta Juridica 135. 
63 Madolo v Nomawu (1896) 1 NAC 12; Makholiso and Others v Makholiso and Others 1997 (4) SA 509 (TkS), 
519E. See also AJ Kerr The Customary Law of Immovable Property and of Succession 2 ed (1990) 99. 
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Constitution.  The community’s acceptance64 of this change reflects a transformed notion of 
the African customary law principle of male primogeniture.65  
Official customary law, on the other hand, stands in direct contrast to living customary 
law in so far as it is written and hence crystallised and fixed at the time of writing.  It is the law 
that is generally applied by the courts as well as other state institutions because it is easy to 
ascertain.66  It is written and codified, and is reflected in textbooks, judicial precedents, and 
other scholarly publications.67  Bennett refers to official customary law as ‘ossified in official 
code’ on account of this written nature.68  In Bhe, the court held that official customary law 
exists in textbooks as well as in statutes.69  Since the official law captures a living oral tradition 
in written form, it does not accurately reflect true African customary law.70  For this reason, 
the courts prefer to apply the living version of African customary law.71  
(b) Traditional African customary contracting 
The textbook accounts of the African customary law of contract have significant differences 
from the prevailing common law of contract.  Some examples of these differences would be: 
the types of agreements found within African customary law; the nature of the underlying 
transactions; the requirements for the formation of a contract; the nature of performance; and 
finally, the nature of contract enforcement and dispute resolution.72  By definition, a ‘contract’ 
entails agreement between parties: this type of transaction is also found in African customary 
law, usually for a performance (and hardly ever for non-performance), between two adult 
parties who reach the voluntary consensus that violation of their agreement’s terms should 
 
64 See Shilubana (note 51 above), para 54, where the Court noted that the ‘Valoyi people moved away from any 
previously existing rule that a woman could never be appointed as a Hosi’. Of course the acceptance was not 
unanimous, there were dissenting voices. 
65 Another example that illustrates the fluidity of living customary law is found in Mabena v Letsoalo (note 54 
above) where it became acceptable for a female head to negotiate and accept lobolo, a role which had traditionally 
been always reserved for males.  
66 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 33; Rautenbach & Bekker (note 10 above) 29; Bhe (note 59 above), para 87. 
67 Rautenbach & Bekker (note 10 above) 28. 
68 Bennett (note 4 above) 64. 
69 Bhe (note 59 above), para 86. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid, paras 83-95. 
72 In this regard, see also Mancuso (note 56 above). 
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result in legal consequences.  African customary law contracts are generally concluded by a 
simple verbal agreement between parties.  This by implication requires there to be at least one 
witness to a contract who will be able to give evidence about its existence in case of a dispute.73  
A written document is uncommon.  African customary contracts also do not necessarily follow 
a particular format. 
The literature describes the socially embedded nature of African customary contracting, 
where authority for a particular party to unilaterally enter into a contract is limited.74  This is 
because most contracts in African customary law affect the entire family or community: while 
some types of transactions are exempted,75 an individual is usually expected to consult with 
the rest of his or her family before he or she concludes a contract.  The male family head usually 
contracts on behalf of his family, but he is generally expected to consult with the older (mostly 
male) members of this family before the conclusion of the contract.76  He is also ultimately 
responsible for the fulfilment of the contract.77  Bekker and Rautenbach correctly point out that 
the extent of a contracting party’s duty of consultation depends on the nature of the contract 
being entered into.78  Contracts which may affect the entire family will require more extensive 
consultation than less consequential contracts which may potentially affect only the 
individual.79 
When it comes to contractual negotiations under African customary law, sources point 
towards legal representation of the parties being uncommon.80  In family-centric contracts such 
as marriage, however, uncles and aunts usually negotiate on behalf of the potential spouses as 
well as the broader family.81  These parties do not negotiate as authorised representatives (in a 
 
73 Ibid 174. 
74 Ibid 174. 
75 For example: small transactions which do not have an impact on the contracting party’s family. There are 
infinite examples of these everyday transactions such as (for instance) where one party asks for a cup-full of sugar 
in exchange for some maize porridge.    
76 Rautenbach & Bekker (note 10 above) 145. 
77 See: ibid 145; M Prinsloo & L Vorster ‘Parties’ in Centre for Indigenous Law (ed) Indigenous Contract in 
Bophuthatswana (1990) 21.  
78 Rautenbach & Bekker (note 10 above) 145. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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legal sense), but simply as intermediaries or mouthpieces who act for, and represent the 
interests of, the potential parties to a contract.82  In terms of transmissibility of contractual 
rights, some accounts of the law report that mechanisms which are the functional equivalents 
of the common law’s delegation, cession or other related means of transferring the duties of 
one party to a third party, are generally uncommon in the African customary law of contract.83  
Contractual negotiations are described as being informal and there is usually no technical ritual 
performed in order to formally create obligations.  Most contracting parties will have a good 
knowledge of the general principles of law involved and hence a legal representative is not 
required to intermediate between them. 
(c) Traditional African customary dispute resolution and contracting  
Due to the socially embedded nature of customary contracting described above, performance 
under such contracts by the parties involved has personal implications for their broader 
families, with reputation, respect, and honour of the family name at stake.  In the event of 
conflict, traditional communities have their own customary courts and dispute resolution 
mechanisms, which are deeply rooted in the customs and traditions of each particular group.  
These traditional platforms and mechanisms operate in a manner aimed at preventing violence, 
curbing the perpetuation of conflict, and the avoidance of damage to the relationship between 
the parties involved: all of which could ultimately threaten the social fabric.84  
The lowest level of traditional court is the family court, which is usually presided over 
by the male head of the family.85  Should such proceedings fail, then the next forum is a hearing 
before the extended families where the (mostly) male elders of the extended family deliberate 
on the matter under the guidance of the family patriarch.86  The matter could thereafter be taken 
 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid 146; Prinsloo & Vorster (note 77 above) 25. 
84 See also B Ingelaere ‘The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda’ in L Huyse & M Salter (eds) Traditional Justice and 
Conflict Resolution After Violent Conflict: Learning From African Experiences (2008) 25, 33 available at: 
<http://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/traditional-justice-and-reconciliation-after-violent-conflict-
learning-from-african-experiences_0.pdf>; M Cappelletti ‘Access to justice as a theoretical approach to law and 
a practical programme for reform’ (1992) 109 SALJ 22; TW Bennett A sourcebook of African customary law in 
Southern Africa (1991) 54. 
85 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 255-256; Bennett (note 4 above) 142 
86 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 256; Bennett (note 4 above) 142 
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to the village head and from there ultimately to the Chief’s court.87  In some instances, 
communities have a Paramount Chief who provides the final level of the customary court 
authority.  Chiefs are public officials who have jurisdiction to handle both civil and criminal 
matters.88  In the rare instances that the Chief’s court fails to settle a dispute, the matter then 
progresses to the formal court system, beginning with the Magistrate’s Court and from there 
following the usual hierarchy upwards.89 
Traditional courts are largely informal institutions which do not have rigid rules of 
procedure.90 The presiding officials there usually have no formal training.  There is no legal 
representation or recording of proceedings and the courts rely solely on the traditions and 
customs of the parties to the dispute.  Where a matter has gone beyond the bounds of the family 
court, the entire community may become involved in resolving the dispute.91  On the day of 
the court hearing, for example, the community will gather at a designated place and the 
contending parties are then given the opportunity to present their cases.92  Each of the 
community members in attendance is allowed to examine any of the evidence presented by 
either of the litigants.93  There is typically no specified order of examining or cross-examining 
the witnesses or parties to the dispute.94  The presiding officer, who may be the traditional 
leader, usually then makes a determinative order that reflects the views of the majority of the 
community members.95 
 Since most contracts in African customary law involve the interests of an entire family 
or tribe, remedies for breach of contract are usually aimed at preserving the social ties between 
the families of the parties involved, in addition to ensuring the proper fulfilment of the contract.  
 
87 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 256; Bennett (note 4 above) 142 
88 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 259-260; Bennett (note 4 above) 143-145. 
89 Section 12(4) Black Administration Act 38 of 1927.  Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 256.  Bennett (note 4 
above) 147, 
90 Bekker & Rautenbach (note 10 above) 242.  See, however, HWO Okoth-Ogendo ‘The nature of land rights 
under indigenous law in Africa’ in A Classens & B Cousins Land, Power & Custom (2008) 95, 96-97 who argues 
that description of African customary law as ‘informal’ was one of a number of  ‘juridical fallacies’ regarding 
African customary law. 
91 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 257. 
92 Bennett (note 4 above) 166. 
93 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 257.  Bennett (note 4 above) 166. 
94 Bennett (note 4 above) 166. 
95 Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) 257.  Bennett (note 4 above) 167. 
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On a more general note, Bennett argues that the dealings of customary courts tend to be 
reconciliatory.96  This contrasts with the formal courts’ method of dispute resolution, which is 
more adversarial, usually with a clear winner and loser.97  A further difference relates to the 
fact that in the formal court system, the ‘male elders’ are substituted for relatively younger 
judicial officers, whose number may include female officers.  The net result of these differences 
is that most customary disputes are resolved within the confines of the families of the parties 
involved, rather than in the formal courts.  The same male elders who were consulted during 
the formation of the contract are usually asked to play a role in the negotiations toward the 
peaceful and conciliatory resolution of any contractual disputes.  Kariuki argues that this 
method of African dispute resolution exists even in societies which do not formally recognise 
the ‘institution’ of male elders and that this system continues to operate outside the influence 
of the State.98  
In sum: traditional courts operate in a highly relational community context, where 
disputes are viewed as embedded within the context of broader society.  This leads to a process 
of dispute resolution more focused on inter-personal relationships than clear legal rights.99  The 
result is that customary contracting cannot be viewed as divorced from the relationship between 
the parties and their respective families, pointing toward an intersection between relational 
contract theory and traditional customary contracting and concomitant dispute resolution 
processes.  An important unanswered question, however, is as to whether the account thus far 
in part III(b) and (c) has represented ‘official’ or ‘living’ customary law, particularly since most 
of the sources drawn on above are written library sources, particularly the works of African 
customary law scholars, legislation, and judicial precedent.  The reader may further ask 
whether the above representation holds true in the heterogeneous and (sometimes) transient 
populations of South Africa’s urban townships.  In the following part IV we move to this latter 
 
96 TW Bennett ‘Human rights and the African cultural tradition’ (1993) Transformation 22. 
97 See also B Goldin & M Gelfand African Law and Custom in Rhodesia (1975) 245; A Ladley ‘Changing the 
Courts in Zimbabwe: The Customary Law and Primary Courts Act’ (1982) 26 J of African Law 103. 
98 F Kariuki ‘Conflict Resolution by Elders in Africa: Successes, Challenges and Opportunities’ available at: 
<https://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-source/centenarydocs/speaker-assets/francis-kariuki.pdf?sfvrsn=0> 1. See 
generally: JL Comaroff & S Roberts Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of Dispute in an African Context 
(1981) at chapter 1. 
99 Bennett (note 6 above) 138, 138-141. 
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context, but we will introduce a new economic element into our own narrative, setting out the 
concept of a ‘popular economy’.   
IV AFRICAN COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING IN THE POPULAR ECONOMY 
The South African economy is a market-based one, with freedom of economic activity 
enshrined as a fundamental right in the Constitution.100  This capitalist feature is balanced with 
other entrenched socio-economic rights, however, and is backed up by a system of government-
sponsored social assistance.101  While public services – particularly healthcare, education, and 
policing – are frequently criticised, the social grants paid on a monthly basis to a large number 
of recipients provide a source of welfare and basic income to many South Africans who are not 
in formal employment.  The grants in question represent a meagre, yet steady, income stream, 
but are not universally available and need to be supplemented by South Africa’s poor and 
unemployed in order to survive.102  These gaps left in the economic framework, provide the 
context for the so-called ‘popular economy’, a notional space where traditional African culture 
and contemporary (South African) existence intersect.103 
 In the social sciences, a distinction is sometimes drawn between the ‘formal’ and the 
‘informal’ sectors.104  In the South African context, this could be used to distinguish between 
those in salaried employment, and those who make a living based on their entrepreneurial 
talents, outside of the mainstream economy reflected in tax records.105  Scholars working on 
 
100 Section 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
101 Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004.  See generally: M Olivier ‘Social Security: Framework’ in WA Joubert (ed) 
The Law of South Africa Vol 13(2) 2 ed (2012). 
102 There are various categories of social grant available, including ‘Grants for Older Persons’ and ‘Child Support 
Grants’.  The relevant government website is: <http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/social-grants>.  To give 
ballpark figures: the 2017 budget speech announced that the grant for older persons (state pension) would be 
increased to R1 600 per month that year. 
103 For a clear defence of the popular economy concept, see: E Hull & D James ‘Introduction: Popular Economies 
in South Africa’ (2012) 82 Africa 1.  For further context see: J Seekings ‘Taking Disadvantage Seriously: the 
“Underclass” in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (2014) 84 Africa 135. 
104 Keith Hart is usually credited with having first defined this dichotomy in the 1970s, see: K Hart ‘Informal 
Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana’ (1973) 11 Journal of Modern African Studies 61. 
105 See the sources cited in note 103 above. 
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the popular economy have shown the formal/informal dichotomy to be misleading, however.106  
This is because ‘formal sector’ wages may be employed as capital for ‘informal sector’ 
entrepreneurship, or as a means of support (through remittances) for third parties who are 
engaged in ‘informal’ economic activities.107  The term ‘popular economy’ thus captures the 
broader social context in which South Africans live and operate, particularly at the fringes of 
the mainstream economy.   
The popular economy is a common context for empirical studies by economic 
anthropologists or sociologists, but it is not often considered by doctrinal lawyers; certainly not 
by mainstream contract lawyers.  We believe that it is a good setting in which to base our 
discussion of the living customary law of commercial contracts.  This is because this social 
context exists largely beyond the reach of the common law, with business norms hence being 
located in cultural practices.  To the extent that this milieu is ‘African’, although probably 
neither homogeneous nor drawing from only one ethnicity, we are able to observe a stronger 
role for African cultural contracting practices.  Of course, this is not to say that many who live 
by the tenets of African customary law in some aspects of their lives are not engaged in 
mainstream economic activities.  Clearly there is a black middle class, many of whom engage 
in blue chip commercial contracting as both principals and agents.  Our argument is rather that 
if we are looking for the living customary law of commercial contracting, which we suggest is 
possibly different from the mainstream common law of contract and (as of yet) is largely un-
amalgamated with this version, a good place to begin is in the contract practices which are 
occurring amongst the African population outside of the mainstream economy.  This approach 
assumes a concept of contract law based in deep legal pluralism. 
Our inquiry aims to answer this question: if a businessperson contracts in one of South 
Africa’s large townships, what is the governing legal system?  The law on the books 
(positivist/centralist) answer would probably refer to the mainstream contract law, to be applied 
through the mainstream court system (including the Small Claims Court), or through 
recognised alternative dispute resolution tribunals (such as industry Ombuds or the National 
Consumer Tribunal).  A law in action response might acknowledge in contrast, however, that 
much of this popular economy contract practice occurs outside of the formal contract regime, 
 
106 Hull & James note 103 above at 7-10.  See further: the other articles in this special edition of Africa (2012); 
Seekings & Nattrass (note 3above). 
107 Hull & James note 103 above at 7-10. 
23 
 
in the sense that the positive law may not be known to the participants; legal representation 
may be unaffordable or undesired; and the system of courts viewed with suspicion or as too far 
removed from the everyday realities of contracting parties.108  This type of response is 
supported by several studies by social scientists working in South Africa,109 as well the 
anecdotal (lived) experience of the two authors of this paper.  In what follows, a basic literature 
review will be given of the sources which led to our thesis; as well as a brief introduction to 
the world-wide discourse on non-contractual relations and private ordering, which are key 
features of relational contracting and at the heart of our central argument: namely, that the 
living customary law of contracting is relational in nature.  
(a) The popular economy and contracting 
Economics as a field deals with the question as to how scarce resources are allocated in 
society.110  Anthropology is the study of culture, and sociology the study of social 
organisation.111  Contract law, by contrast deals with the rules and principles which govern 
(particularly economic) transactions.  ‘Contract practice’, in our conceptualisation is a broader 
area, dealing not only with governing rules and principles, but also with aspects of economics 
(underlying motivations: wants and needs with regard to resources), as well as anthropology 
and sociology (what is the business culture in a given group and how is it organised to facilitate 
commerce?).112  Using a plural conception of ‘contract law’, whereby norms are generated not 
only by central government, but also by the practice of communities, we intend to link the 
living customary law of contract to the descriptions of contract practice by economists, 
anthropologists, and sociologists.  This conceptual progression is the background to how we 
 
108 See part IV(b) below.  Support for this type of inter-disciplinary study of law, which rejects the existing formal 
discourse as incomplete and distorted could find a theoretical grounding in the post-structuralist analysis of law 
as a ‘general’, rather than a ‘restricted’ jurisprudence.  Costas Douzinas & Adam Geary Critical Jurisprudence: 
The Political Philosophy of Justice (2005) argue at 17 that a ‘[General jurisprudence] accepts the importance that 
the context has in understanding the law, but places context within the legal text and reads legal texts and legal 
history as aspects of social being in which other expressions of sociality, like politics, economics or ethics, will 
be reflected.’ 
109 See for example the sources listed in notes 113-118 below. 
110 MQ Patton Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods 3ed (2002) 216. 
111 Ibid. 
112 This broader, socially embedded understanding of contracting is core to the themes in the literature related to 
relational contract theory, such as ‘contractual relations’; ‘non-use of contract’; and ‘private ordering’.  For a 
discussion of this theory, see IV(c) below. 
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will derive our core hypotheses about the living customary law of contracting from the contract 
practice described in accounts of the popular economy. 
Several empirical studies have dealt with issues related to contracting like: informal 
credit,113 informal risk management,114 informal trade,115 village banks,116 stokvels,117 and 
burial societies.118  All of the above studies were situated in South Africa amongst the 
indigenous African population, although similar studies have been done in other African 
 
113 See for example: D James ‘Money-Go-Round: Personal Economies of Wealth, Aspiration and Indebtedness’ 
(2012) 82 Africa 20; MP Mashigo ‘Social Structures and Financial Service Delivery to Poor Households in South 
Africa’ (2012) 47 Journal of Public Administration 330; D Porteous & E Hazelhurst Banking on Change: 
Democratising Finance in South Africa, 1994-2004 and Beyond (2004) chapters 4-6; CR Cross ‘Informal Credit 
– Or, How Does a Rural Community Capitalize Itself?’ paper presented at the 17th annual congress for the 
association of sociology in Southern Africa held at the University of Natal, Durban 1986.  
114 E Bähre ‘The Janus Face of Insurance in South Africa: From Costs to Risk, From Networks to Bureaucracies’ 
(2012) 82 Africa 150; LG Mpedi & D Millard, ‘Bridging the gap: the role of micro-insurance in a comprehensive 
social-protection system in South Africa’ (2010) 31 Obiter 497; A Hutchison ‘A Customary Insurance Law?’ 
(2017) 29 SA Merc LJ 17 (forthcoming). 
115 The Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI – an independent South African NGO) has made this one of their 
special projects, see the publications on their website, for example: D Webster ‘“The End of the Street?” Informal 
Traders’ Experiences of Rights and Regulations in Inner City Johannesburg’ (2015) available at: 
<http://www.seri-sa.org/images/Seri_informal_traders_report_FINAL_FOR_SIGN_OFF_2.pdf >. 
116 E Hull ‘Banking in the Bush: Waiting for Credit in South Africa’s Rural Economy’ (2012) 82 Africa 168; GA 
Jones & A Dallimore ‘Whither Participatory Banking? Experiences with Village Banks in South Africa’ (2009) 
European J of Development Research 344; Porteous & Hazelhurst (note 113 above); P Mashigo & H Kubir 
‘Village Banks: A Financial Strategy for Developing the South African Poor Households’ (2016) 11 Int J on 
Banks and Bank Systems 8. 
117 For South Africa see: G Verhoef ‘Informal Financial Service Institutions for Survival: African Women and 
Stokvels in Urban South Africa, 1930-1998’ (2001) 2 Enterprise & Society 259; D James Money from Nothing: 
Indebtedness and Aspiration in South Africa (2015) 118-146; WG Schultze ‘The Origin and Legal Nature of the 
Stokvel’ (Parts 1&2) (1997) 9 SA Merc LJ 18; 153; MP Mashigo & C Schoeman ‘Stokvels as an Instrument and 
Channel to Extend Credit to Poor Households in South Africa’ (2012) 5 Jl of Economic and Financial Services 
49.  There is also an international literature, see seminally: S Ardener ‘The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit 
Associations’ (1964) 94 J of the Royal Anthropological Institute 201. 
118 RJ Thomson & DB Posel ‘The Management of Risk by Burial Societies in South Africa’ (2002) 2 SA Actuarial 
J 83; Verhoef (note 117 above) 266-269; Schultze (note 117 above) 27-29. 
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countries.119  Different normative points of view are advanced in this material and different 
types of questions are asked, using qualitative and quantitative research methodologies.  What 
emerges strongly from all these accounts, however, is that there is vibrant commercial activity 
going on in the popular economy, underpinned by economic transactions and hence ‘contract 
practice’.120  The picture painted in such sources is different to the types of transaction 
mentioned in the leading works on African customary law, although the community-orientated 
nature of most of the transactions suggests a continuity of contexts.121  A tentative view which 
we venture is that the literature on the popular economy presents primary sources to be used as 
evidence in the updating of the traditional accounts of African customary contracting: rather 
than a pre-commercial vision of society, where contracts related mostly to marriage, co-
operative labour, or arrangements for the care of livestock;122 the popular economy discourse 
presents a modern, urbanised population, operating in a monetised economy and interacting on 
various levels with the formal sector economy and law.  The appeal of this alternative picture 
of popular economy contracting is that it is strongly commercial and fills the gaps in the 
representations offered by more traditional accounts.  
For us, this is where the living customary law of commercial contracts is to be found – 
an empirical study needs to be done which asks questions of a different nature to the concerns 
of economics, anthropology, and sociology.  We need to know how law operates in this sphere.  
The evidence presented by these empirical studies is incomplete for the purposes of a proper 
account of contract law, since only contract practice is represented.  However, based on popular 
economy accounts, certain key features emerge about contracting in this sector.  For the present 
authors, these answers can be distilled into a number of broad propositions: 
i. Credit is usually extended to relatives, friends, or other known associates.  Credit is 
seldom extended to strangers – that is the role of conventional banks and micro-
lenders.  The reason for this feature is the high degree of knowledge about a 
 
119 CM Dickerson ‘Promises of Future Performance and Informal Sector Transfers of Personal Property: The 
Example of Anglophone Cameroon’ (2011) Acta Juridica 285; M Fafchamps ‘The Enforcement of Commercial 
Contracts in Ghana’ (1996) 24 World Development 427. 
120 See for example the sources listed in footnotes 113-118 above. 
121 The examples given by Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) in chapter 10 relate almost entirely to a familial 
context, or to contractual relations between members of a community. 
122 Compare: Himonga & Nhlapo (note 4 above) chapter 10; Bekker (note 27 above); Rautenbach & Bekker (note 
10 above) chapter 7. 
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contracting counter-party, which induces trust and reliance.  The problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard are reduced by this factor, and knowledge-based 
trust serves as collateral.123 
ii. Executory contracts are thus known to the popular economy: risk is managed as 
above through symmetrical knowledge structures.  Peer pressure also plays a role, 
given the ability to do reputational harm to a contracting party through negative 
gossip.124 
iii. ‘Ubuntu’, or a communitarian conception of fair dealing, is to be found in the 
popular economy, and a lack of this quality is sometimes advanced as a criticism of 
formal sector contracting parties, such as banks and other micro-lenders.125   
iv. But, promises are to be kept, in the sense that obligations are viewed as binding and 
parties as autonomous.126 
v. Dispute resolution between members of the community is capable of being resolved 
through non-legal means.  Disputes with formal sector partners, particularly 
financial institutions, can present a problem due to the dictates of the positive law 
and legal procedure.127 
The emergent picture is thus that contracting in the popular economy is community-
centred and -centric.  A community-based form of contracting means that transactions probably 
occur between repeat players, who are known to one another.  This makes it probable that there 
 
123 James (note 117 above) 124; Mashigo & Kubir (note 116 above) 11; MP Mashigo Extending Credit to the 
Low-income and Poor Households in South Africa: A System of Principles unpublished PhD thesis (University of 
Johannesburg, 2007) chapter 4; Verhoef (note 117 above) 272-278. 
124 Thomson & Posel (note 118 above) 109-111; Mashigo (note 123 above) chapter 4. 
125 For use of the term ‘ubuntu’ in this context, see: Verhoef (note 117 above) 273.  On the relationship between 
the ‘community’ and formal sector parties, such as banks, see the general narrative in Jones & Dallimore (note 
116 above) (although the tone is sceptical here).  See, however, the sceptical view of Erik Bähre Money and 
Violence (2007) at 133-139, who cautions that the concept of ‘ubuntu’ is not comfortable in an anthropological 
account of the popular economy. 
126 This is fundamental to an analysis of contracting in any community.  In this article we suggest two alternative 
means of enforcement (beyond formal sector courts), namely: (1) through relational means as in the text attached 
to note 121 below; or (2) through dispute resolution platforms, as discussed in part III(c) above and part IV(b) 
below. 
127 Bähre (note 114 above) discusses this key factor at 160-163.  In a similar context, see: PM Nienaber & J Preiss 
‘Funeral insurance: A perception from the office of the ombudsman for long-term insurance’ (2006) 18 SA Merc 
LJ 291.  On township dispute resolution platforms, see the following part IV(b). 
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is a strong relational element to contracting in the popular economy, at least where contracting 
is between community members.  Before defending this theoretical claim, however, we will, 
as in the previous part III, explore dispute resolution, this time in the South African urban 
township milieu.   
(b) Dispute resolution in South Africa’s urban townships 
An urban format of African customary law is applied through informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms which are influenced by African customary law in order to manage conflict and 
maintain peace in the townships.128  These courts apply neither traditional (read: ‘textbook’) 
African customary law nor common law, but utilise a mixture of the two, with a strong basis 
in African customary law norms.129  The relevant dispute resolution bodies are the Street 
Committees or Section Committees who perform the function of urban customary courts.130  
These committees form the second tier of informal courts in the townships after the family 
court and have jurisdiction over a number of streets (a variety of methods is used to determine 
geographical boundaries).  In other communities, Street Committees report to Executive 
Committees or Ward Committees; thereafter, the matter goes to the police.131  Such committees 
meet either in community public places or in members’ homes, hearing civil cases which 
mainly relate to disputes between community members.  They also liaise with formal 
authorities such as the police and municipalities on behalf of the community. 
Burman and Schärf argue that these dispute resolution structures in the townships are 
based on the informal courts of the rural areas.132  The township versions resemble customary 
courts in that they are informal and hence less intimidating than the formal courts: no legal 
representation is required; no fees are involved for a case to be heard; proceedings are held in 
familiar surroundings; tribunals apply the basic communitarian principles which people are 
 
128 Bennett (note 42 above) 91.  See further: J Seekings ‘The revival of “people’s courts”: Informal Justice in 
Transitional South Africa’ in G Moss & I Obery (eds) South African Review 6 (1992) 186; S Burman & W Schärf 
‘People’s justice: street committees and people’s courts in a South African city’ (1990) 24 Law and Society Rev 
693; BDD Radipati ‘Informal dispute resolution in South Africa: A comparative and jurisprudential study’ 
unpublished LLM dissertation (University of the Witwatersrand, 1993). 
129 Bennett (note 42 above) 91. 
130 Burman & Schärf (note 128 above) 706. 
131 Ibid 706 - 707. 
132 Ibid 693. 
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used to; and proceedings commence at the family level and escalate through various platforms 
to a formal court, as per traditional customary dispute resolution.133  These township structures 
hence provide great utility to inhabitants, since due to the residential layout of these 
communities, formal governance and policing achieve only a low level of penetration.134  In 
addition, community members tend to have a lack of confidence in the formal judicial 
structures, compounding such utility.135  Great emphasis is usually placed on mediation in order 
to reconcile parties, with the ultimate goal being settlement.  In practice, it is often the case that 
when parties report a dispute to the police they are advised to first approach a community 
dispute resolution platform.136 
Although the account above is brief, one can see the interplay between formal structures 
(such as police and governance services) and these informal dispute resolution tribunals in 
South Africa’s popular economy.  The existence of these popular economy platforms also 
demonstrates the scope for private ordering to govern contractual disputes in this sphere.  
Hence super-imposed on ordinary party-to-party contractual relations and resultant inter-
personal ordering, there is an additional layer of private ordering, through community 
structures.  For us, this second layer of ordering reinforces our argument that contracting in the 
popular economy is relational, since it is not just the parties’ own relationship which needs to 
be preserved, but the harmony of the greater community as a whole.  In the following section 
we will build on the findings reached thus far in part IV to construct our own theory of African 
customary commercial contracting in the popular economy.   
(c) Legal pluralism and relational contract theory in the popular economy     
Moving from a review of the empirical literature to the literature on socio-legal theory, we 
return to our discussion of the overlap between legal pluralism and relational contract theory, 
as alluded to above.  The genesis of relational contract theory was in the United States, although 
 
133 Bekker & Rautenbach (note 10 above) 246.  Bennett (note 4 above) 155, 158. 
134 Bekker & Rautenbach (note 10 above) 246. 
135 Ibid at 246-247. 
136 In this regard, see also W Schärf ‘Policy options on community justice’ in W Schärf & D Nina (eds) The other 
law. Non state ordering in South Africa (2001) 39; C Shearing ‘Transforming security: a South African 
experiment’ in H Strang & J Braithwaite (eds) Restorative justice and civil society (2001) 14; J Seekings ‘The 
changing face of urban civic organization’ (2011) 75 Transformation 140; J Froestad & C Shearing Security 
governance, policing, and local capacity (2012). 
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it has adherents in other countries as well: particularly the United Kingdom, but also in South 
Africa.137  A very clear articulation of the general argument put forward by this movement 
could be briefly set out with reference to the work of Hugh Collins.138  Using Collins’s analysis, 
we will argue that a contractual relation (in the sense of an ongoing nexus between two or more 
parties, underpinning a particular transaction between them) can be viewed as existing on three 
planes: First, there are terms of the agreement itself, whether written or oral.  Second, there are 
the underlying economic considerations motivating both parties – such as, how does the 
conclusion of this transaction increase each party’s utility?  Finally, there is the human element 
of the transaction: the inter-personal relationship between the parties.  This three-
dimensional139 analysis allows for a broader perspective on the contractual relation.  In 
particular, it allows for the influence of extraneous circumstances of the non-legal variety on 
the contractual relationship between the parties.  This, we suggest, is a human-centred approach 
to contracting, which fits well into a community setting with repeat players. 
 The literature on stokvels, burial societies, and other forms of savings and risk 
management clubs suggests that transactions in this sphere are enforced through relational 
means; particularly, using the above analysis, the economic and inter-personal planes.  This, 
we suggest, could be partially explained by the literature on ‘non-contractual relations’.140  This 
school of thought holds that contract disputes are largely resolved by negotiation between the 
parties: this not only preserves the relationship (and in a community setting, a measure of social 
harmony), but also avoids transactions costs, particularly in the form of time and money, which 
are necessitated by a recourse to the formal law or formal legal dispute resolution 
 
137 See the sources cited in note 18 above for the key US and UK materials.  For South Africa, see: L Hawthorne 
‘Relational Contract Theory: Is the Antagonism Directed at Discrete Exchanges and Presentiation Justified?’ in 
G Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 137 and ‘The First Traces of Relational Contract Theory – 
The Implicit Dimension of Co-operation (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 234; T Cohen ‘The Relational Contract of 
Employment’ (2012)  Acta Juridica 84-101; A Hutchison ‘Relational Theory, Context and Commercial Common 
Sense: Views on Contract Interpretation and Adjudication’ (2017) 134 SALJ 296. 
138 H Collins (note 18 above);  H Collins ‘The Contract of Employment in 3D’ in D Campbell, L Mulcahy & S 
Wheeler (eds) Changing Concepts of Contract: Essays in Honour of Ian Macneil (2016) 65. 
139 The ‘three dimensional’ descriptor is borrowed from Collins (note 138 above). 
140 Macaulay (note 13 above) is the seminal text here.  See further: D Campbell ‘What do we mean by the non-
use of contract?’ in J Braucher, J Kidwell & WC Whitford (eds) Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart 
Macaulay (2013) 159, 164.  
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mechanisms.141  A distrust of lawyers and the utility which they add to a contractual relation 
can be found in several international studies of businessmen.142  Similar evidence is also to be 
found in the sources on the popular economy, along with the obvious point that recourse to the 
formal law is beyond the financial means of many popular economy participants, even if they 
wanted to go this route.143   
If we move beyond formal sector adjudicative platforms to alternative means of 
contract enforcement based on community relations, what form of coercion is left to the parties 
to a customary commercial contract?  The answer is non-legal sanctions:144 a refusal to do 
repeat business (an economic sanction) can shut off a vital avenue of supply, whether of goods, 
services, or credit.  Similarly, adverse comment and social peer pressure (inter-personal 
sanctions) can motivate contractual compliance in a situation where parties are members of a 
community where these factors matter.  Opportunism, in the sense of selfish exploitation of the 
vulnerabilities of others under a given contractual matrix, is of course a universal human 
condition, and explains some of the reported cases of default and fraud.  In a normative sense, 
however, a lack of perfect success for the community-enforcement model does not negate it as 
a system of ‘private ordering’, by which term we signify that the transactional matrix operates 
largely without recourse to central law enforcement, through the actions and interventions of 
players in the market.145  In our view, such a system, displaying a system of normative practices 
 
141 See Macaulay (note 18 above).  For an account of transaction cost economics linking this concept to relational 
theory, see: OE Williamson The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985).   
142 In addition to Macaulay (note 18 above), see: S Deakin, C Lane & F Wilkinson ‘Contract Law, Trust Relations, 
and Incentives for Co-operation: A Comparative Study’ in S Deakin & J Michie (eds) Contracts, Co-operation, 
and Competition (1997) 105; Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale ‘Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the 
Use of Contractual Remedies’ (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45. 
143 See the discussion in part IV(a)-(b) above. 
144 See for example: David Charny ‘Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships’ (1990-91) 104 Harvard 
LR 373; Collins (note 18 above) chapter 5. 
145 For an overview of the ‘private ordering’ literature, see: BD Richman ‘Firms, Courts and Reputation 
Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering’ (2004) 104 Columbia LR 2328.  For empirical 
studies, see: RC Ellickson Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991); L Bernstein ‘Opting out 
of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal 
Studies 115; L Bernstein ‘Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent 
Business Norms’ (1995-96) 144 University of Pennsylvania LR 1765; L Bernstein ‘Private Commercial Law in 
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions’ (2000-01) 99 Michigan LR 
1724.  For an African perspective, see: Fafchamps (note 119 above). 
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allowing for private ordering could also be described as deep legal pluralism; if one accepts 
the premise of this legal theory that ‘law’ originates in the practices of a given community, 
provided these are viewed as binding by that community.  Then, assume that this community, 
which practises private ordering in their contractual relations with each other, also adheres to 
traditional African customary law normative practices, such as the payment of lobola when 
getting married.  On this basis a strong argument could be made that that system of contractual 
private ordering constituted the ‘living customary law of commercial contracting’, whether 
applied directly through relations inter partes, or by a more formalised township community 
platform.  While we accept that indigenous black South Africans may live by African 
customary norms in some aspects of their lives (such as marriage and family relations), but not 
in others (such as their business dealings), it must be to those who are cultural insiders that a 
researcher looks when testing for contract practice and a business philosophy which is 
definitively ‘African’ and possibly thus distinct from Eurocentric norms.  It is in this realm of 
cultural adherents that a living customary law of commercial contracting must be sought.  
V THE LIVING CUSTOMARY LAW OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING: SOME 
HYPOTHESES  
To summarise: the argument thus far in this paper raises three central hypotheses: 
i. Contracting in the popular economy is highly relational, resting on what are described 
in the world literature as ‘non-contractual relations’; ‘non-legal sanctions’; and ‘private 
ordering’. 
ii. In a given community transacting amongst each other in the South African popular 
economy, the resultant contractual relations give rise to a normative order which 
constitutes the living customary law of commercial contracting.  This living law of 
contracting may involve an interplay between indigenous forms of contract practice 
and formal sector institutions, particularly banks.   
iii. This interplay is at the heart of the formal/informal sector intersection which typifies 
the popular economy, making this the key locus in which to study a modern, urbanised 
living customary law of commercial contracts.  The final answer to the question, ‘what 
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is African about contracting in South Africa?’ is thus to be found through empirical 
research in this context.   
VI CONCLUSION 
All that remains then is for us to tie up the narrative threads left unresolved by our opening 
discussion in parts I and II above.  This article has suggested some answers to the questions:  
i. ‘What is African about contracting in South Africa?’; and  
ii. ‘What is the role of community in contracting in South Africa’s popular economy?’   
Our suggested answers to these questions above show that we interpret the literature as 
suggesting that ‘community’ remains at the heart of African contracting in the popular 
economy; and that the same would appear to be true of the traditional discourse.  We agree 
with Gyekye, however, that this is a moderate form of communitarianism, which accepts a role 
for individualism and private property, but also imposes a measure of social responsibility.  
Perhaps, using the Constitutional Court’s own narrative, one could call this philosophy a state 
of ‘ubuntu’.  Is this idealised?  Possibly – the empirical sources are replete with examples of 
the failures of ‘community’: both through the opportunistic exploitation of counter-parts; and 
through the abuse of African customary structures, such as stokvels.146  Opportunism and even 
fraud are to be found in any system of contracting, however, and their similar presence in 
African customary contracting should not necessarily derail our theoretical construct. 
 Another question is how to deal with the plural nature of our legal system and the 
balance between the equal sources of African customary and common law.  For example, 
having identified a parallel contracting context with its own rules and culture, what is the 
impact of this to be on the generally applicable common law of contract?  The Constitutional 
Court’s argument appears to be that the underlying ubuntu/community ethos of African 
customary law should inform the common law notion of public policy.147  This allows for the 
protection of weaker parties, which is a good thing, but may have an impact on contractual 
certainty.148  One possible interpretation of the Constitutional Court’s paradigm of argument is 
 
146 A good qualitative example of a source arguing for this position may be found in Bähre (note 114 above). 
147 See the discussion of public policy in the seminal Barkhuizen (note 12 above), para 51. 
148 This conflict is explored in Hutchison (note 34 – 2017) above. 
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that it is aimed at an ‘amalgam’ of common and African customary law in the future,149 
addressing Chanock’s concerns about the segregation of these two sources, and indeed echoing 
the sentiments of ZK Matthews, expressed as long ago as 1934.150  There may be problems 
here, however, given the lack of epistemological fit between the oral customary law tradition 
and the written common law one.  The Constitutional Court’s discourse on ubuntu thus far 
could also be ascribed (on an alternative basis) simply to the international trend towards the 
constitutionalisation of contract law to protect weaker parties, which uses open norms such as 
public policy and good faith to incorporate constitutional values, rather than necessarily 
drawing these from African customary law per se.  This view would open such jurisprudence 
to the possible criticism of cultural assimilation.  Our counterpoint to this argument would be 
that contracting as a method of facilitating economic exchange is universal to all cultures, 
resting in large part on economic considerations, rather than only on positive law.  Hence 
conceptual overlap is inevitable and indeed to be encouraged.151   
Another suggestion as to a possible method of amalgamation could be to recognise yet 
another parallel contracting regime: in the same way that there are very different regimes of 
commercial and consumer contract law, there could be a third channel of customary contract 
law.  An appropriate choice of law regime would then have to be worked out, but an ability to 
 
149 Alexkor (note 60 above), para 51.  While in Alexkor the Constitutional Court was careful to stress the separate 
identity of African customary law as a source of law, there is no reason why it should not have an impact on the 
general South African common law.  As past histories of the common law have been at pains to point out, this 
construct itself has always been a mixture of ideas.  The idea of amalgamation is also one possible interpretation 
of Yacoob J’s statement at para 23 of his minority judgment dealing with the common law of contract in Everfresh 
(note 12 above), as well as the other curial passages cited in that footnote. 
150 ZK Matthews ‘Bantu Law and Western Civilisation in South Africa: A Study in the Clash of Cultures’ 
unpublished MA thesis (Yale University, 1934) 354-356.  NR Mandela Long Walk To Freedom (1994) 42 
describes ZK Matthews, one of his law professors during his LLB studies at Fort Hare and part of an earlier 
generation of ANC leadership, as ‘the very model of the intellectual’, who taught ‘social anthropology and African 
law and spoke out bluntly against the [Apartheid] government’s social policies.’ 
151 In a different context, see the equation drawn between ubuntu, restorative justice and the amende honorable in 
Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) in the judgments of Mokgoro J and Sachs J.  See further Andre 
Mukheibir ‘Ubuntu and the Amende Honorable – A Marriage between African Values and Medieval Canon Law’ 
(2007) Obiter 583; GJ van Niekerk ‘Amende Honorable and Ubuntu: An Intersection of Ars Boni et Aequi in 
African and Roman-Dutch Jurisprudence?’ (2013) 19 Fundamina 397.  A more generalised discussion of social 
transformation in a multi-cultural context with resultant mingling of cultural identities can be found in Homi K 
Bhabha ‘Culture’s In-Between’ in Stuart Hall & Paul du Gay (eds) Questions of Cultural Identity (1996) 53.  
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choose such a regime would fit nicely with the fundamental premise of contracting as involving 
the private arrangements of the parties themselves.  This second option would preserve the 
distinct identity of the living customary law of contracting, while allowing for its judicial 
development.152 
 On status and contract: everywhere there seem to be signs that with the post-
constitutional waning of freedom of contract in South Africa, we are reverting from contract to 
status, echoing Atiyah’s claim (with reference to Britain) in 1979.153  Before evaluating a 
contract, a legal adviser must first ask whether the parties are consumers or commercial entities; 
or beyond this, whether the context suggests an inequality of bargaining power that may raise 
constitutional flags.  Who the parties to a contract are and the nature of their transaction is 
highly relevant in the modern South African era.  Our literature review above suggests that this 
is also the case in African customary law, but with the ‘status’ element possibly being more 
community-related.  Of course, a community-orientated view of contracting can be found in 
many ‘Western’ sources as well, the literature on relational contract theory cited above would 
be a good place to begin such an inquiry.  It thus seems fair to argue that in modern South 
African contracting, whether in the common law or the African customary law context, 
contracting is all about status.  This conclusion allows us to make the claim above that the 
living customary law of commercial contracting should best be analysed in relational terms.  
Either as a separate construct, or as part of a future amalgamated ‘South African law of 
contract’, customary contract adjudication should be a context sensitive exercise, with the 
relevant contracting community as the foreground consideration. 
 Whether the argument in this conclusion, or indeed in this article as a whole, entails a 
‘decolonisation’ of contract law, or a means to address our racialised economic inequality, may 
be debatable.  Indeed, one could well ask whether the judicial development of the law of 
contract is the best tool for effecting economic redistribution, since its effects are immediate to 
the parties to a particular dispute.  Our intention here is merely to start a discussion about the 
 
152 An example of scholarship calling for greater judicial development of African customary law as a separate 
source of law, is: S Sibanda & TB Mosaka ‘Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha: A Cultural Conundrum, Fanonian 
Alienation, and an Elusive Constitutional Oneness’ (2015) Acta Juridica 256. 
153 See the discussion of this source in note 16 above. 
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future of South African contract law and to present a review of what we consider to be the 
relevant literature on African customary commercial contracting.   
 
 
